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The purpose of this research is to understand why the US didn’t recognize Al-Anfal campaign 
to be a genocide. A research question was therefore made: Why did the US reject Al-Anfal 
campaign as a genocide? To answer this question, the definition of both politicide and 
genocide had to be clearly defined to understand how a conflict could be categorized. This is 
in order to understand the US point of view on the conflict, and to make it easier to explain 
the reasons behind their unrecognition of Al-Anfal campaign being a genocide. By defining 
and connecting both terms up to the political conflict between the US and Iran, this master 
thesis will show how the US chose to cooperate strategically with Iraq to fight the Iranian 
revolution. These connections are important, since they describe the support Saddam Hussein 
received from US, which gave him the opportunity to make a revenge on Kurds who 
cooperated with Iran. The conclusion is that the US rejected to recognize Al-Anfal based on 
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1.1 Theme  
Genocide as a term, is widely known through the international community (Cooper, 2008). 
Through history, we have seen brutal mass killings of Jews by the Nazis during World War II 
(Jones, 2011), and the mass killing in Rwanda (Shaw, 2015). Even though the term is well 
known, there are events where states disagree about whether an event could be recognised as 
a genocide, and Al-Anfal event in Iraq is such an example (Harff, 2003; Middle East Watch, 
1993; Kaveh, 2014). In 1988 the Iraqi army attacked and killed Kurds within the northern 
region of Iraq and destroyed many villages. This event became what’s known as Al-Anfal 
Campaign. Some scholars and states don’t agree upon the campaign as a genocide, which is 
an interesting phenomenon. Since I’m interested in Middle Eastern politics, I chose to do a 
master thesis about the Al-Anfal campaign in Iraq. This is a broad topic, where we can find 
many researches regarding this field. What we can see missing within the research field, is 
research about why states have different opinions regarding whether to consider Al-Anfal to 
be a genocide or a politicide. Through this theme, I will have an opportunity of doing a 
research that might help other scholars, as well as it will narrow my research to have the 
possibility of retrieving relevant data. My main focus in this thesis is to understand why the 
US chose not to recognise Al-Anfal as a genocide, and whether their political involvement 
had an impact on their unrecognition.         
 
1.2 Research question 
This gave me the idea of creating the following research title: The Al-Anfal Campaign; 
Genocide or Politicide? A literature study about the basis for the US standpoint towards the 
Al-Anfal campaign. The title will make it clearer for the reader to know that my field of 
research would be connected to human rights, where I will look at how the US defines the 
terms genocide and politicide. This is where my research question comes in:  
 





Since my research question involves understanding different standpoints, including whether 
the campaign could be recognized internationally, I had to create a supplementary question to 
help me further with my thesis: What were the reasons for the Al-Anfal campaign? The 
question is relevant because we will have to understand the Al-Anfal campaign to know the 
reasons behind the US viewpoint. When referring to the United States of America, I will be 
using both terms “USA” and “US”. The same goes with the Al-Anfal campaign, which can be 
referred to as “Anfal” and “Al-Anfal”.  
 
1.3 Definitions  
1.3.1 Genocide 
We can see that the definition of genocide changes after time, and that its previous definition 
came with the scholar Lemkin, who defined it as a planned, and coordinated destruction, that 
is targeting a racial, religious, national, or an ethnic group. Their aim would be to destruct 
their foundations in which they would annihilate them culturally or physically (Jonassohn & 
Chalk, 1987, p. 7; Lemkin, 1944). A three-part typology was therefore created by Lemkin, 
that’s based on genocide, where he describes that the focus of the first incidents of genocide 
that has occurred in the Middle Ages, had the focus on destroying groups or nations. The 
second part of genocides are mentioned to be related to the aim of destroying a specific 
culture of a population, without harming them physically. The third part of genocides are 
compared to the Nazi genocide, in which it was combined by both modern and ancient types 
of genocide, in which it was referred to by Lemkin as a hybrid version, where the selection of 
some groups and people to be exterminated, while others were selected for ethnocidal 
assimilation. These three parts of typology mentioned by Lemkin helps us to distinguish 
between different categories of genocide. What we can see is that Lemkin couldn’t anticipate 
changes within states that later created genocides internally within nations, where genocide 
from the twentieth-century became a case where states harmed specific groups physically, that 






Another scholar who followed the footsteps of Lemkin was Vahakn Dadrian, who mentioned 
five different types of genocides:  
 
(1) cultural genocide, in which assimilation is the perpetrator’s aim; (2) latent 
genocide, which is the result of activities with unintended consequences, such as 
civilian deaths during bombing raids or the accidental spread of disease during an 
invasion; (3) retributive genocide, designed to punish a segment of a minority 
which challenges a dominant group; (4) utilitarian genocide, using mass killing to 
obtain control of economic resources; and (5) optimal genocide, characterized by 
the slaughter of members of a group to achieve its total obliteration, as in the 
Armenian and Jewish holocausts (Jonassohn & Chalk, 1987, p. 9).   
 
One of the scholars who have mostly contributed his work on genocide, and especially 
problems related to genocidal motivation and process is called Leo Kurper (Jonassohn & 
Chalk, 1987, p. 9). He discusses three different types of motives behind genocide, in which he 
mentions “(1) genocides designed to resolve religious, racial, and ethnic differences; (2) 
genocides intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing empire; and (3) genocides 
perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideology” (Jonassohn & Chalk, 1987, p. 10). 
 
Kuper was mostly concerned about the increasing events of genocide within modern times. 
That’s because the events of modern genocides happen mostly internally inside nation-states, 
and especially in states that consist of plural populations. He therefore mentions two kinds of 
groups that are excluded from the United Nations (UN) definition of genocide. One of these 
groups are victims who have been affected by mass political violence, while the other 
includes attempts of destroying a specific economic class. Kuper explains that earlier occurred 
cases that were related to mass political violence, could have been categorized as a genocide, 
if different political groups were protected through the United Nations Convention (Jonassohn 
& Chalk, 1987, p. 10). Through his description, we can understand that there are some 
unprotected and vulnerable groups, since the UN Convention has a missing part, where it 
doesn’t protect everybody. Such an example could be related to the Al-Anfal campaign, 
where the discussion regarding the consideration of Al-Anfal to be a genocide is divided. 
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Some states such as the US, describes Al-Anfal campaign being a political conflict, and is 
therefore considered to be a politicide. Other states that disagrees upon the unrecognition of 
the event, have the same standpoint as Kuper, where they consider the events of Al-Anfal as 
being related to mass political violence, where it’s supposed to be categorized under the 
Genocide Convention.  
 
It becomes clear that the definition of genocide doesn’t include the extermination of economic 
and political groups, which makes it difficult to measure Al-Anfal campaign up to the 
definition to come to a conclusion. When looking at the definition of genocide today, we will 
see that the UN defines it in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (1948) (Ishay, 2008; Jonassohn & Chalk, 1987, p. 11). Since there are 
many misconceptions regarding the definition of genocide, it might be wise to mention the 
most accepted definition, that’s found “in the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide” 
(Jonassohn & Chalk, 1987, p. 11), which states the following: 
 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such:  
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Jonassohn & Chalk, 







Compared to genocide, the term politicide is different where it defines groups through their 
political resistance against the regime. If we relate politicide as a term to Al-Anfal campaign 
in Iraq, where it’s said that Kurds were targets of genocide, we can see the difference between 
both genocide and politicide. While it’s said that many Kurds suffered of genocide, there exist 
contrary facts about that many Kurds served within the Iraqi military, worked in the 
governmental bureaucracy, while many were members of president Saddam Husseins ruling 
Baath party. This situation shows us that the Baath party wasn’t targeting every Kurdish 
citizen, and it becomes clear that Kurds who got attacked during Al-Anfal, had been either 
involved or supported the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) or the Kurdish Democratic 
Party (KDP). From this perspective the event could be described as a politicide (Harff, 2003, 
p. 58). Therefore, it’s said that politicide is used to preserve stability of the government, in 
which their solution would be to eradicate any citizen or a group whom is found to be 
threatening. Because of the situation, it’s argued that a government would use politicide to 
preserve its stability, especially when the opposition create a threat against the government. 
That’s why anyone who is targeted by a politicide is labelled by the government as a 
subversive (Uzony, 2014, p. 319). Aguila (2006, mentioned in Uzony, 2014, p. 319) explains 
that the reasons behind what constitutes the subversion isn’t clear through politicide. This is 
because when a government feels that a group is threatening them, they will attack the whole 
group without facing a specific enemy. It’s therefore described, and I quote: 
 
Domestic unrest should increase the government’s willingness to use politicide to keep 
non-militarized unrest from leading to violent challenges to the regime. In response to 
unrest, the government may engage in violence designed to keep the population 
confused and unable to coordinate resistance to the government’s attacks. In this 
manner, the government is able to stop unrest from developing into civil war by 
preventing the formation of organized resistance groups through terrorizing cross-






1.4 Academic background  
My academic background is based on political science, where I wrote a bachelor thesis about 
the genocide in Rwanda. This gave me knowledge about how international and non-
governmental organizations work, and how they deal with genocidal crimes. Genocide as a 
term became interesting and I wanted to study a different conflict that is more complex, in 
which there exist a disagreement between states about whether a specific event could be 
recognized as a genocide. That’s when I found Al-Anfal campaign as an interesting conflict. 
The Al-Anfal events in Iraq has not yet been internationally recognized like for example 
Rwanda and studying the case would give me the opportunity to do a research which could 
help other scholars with insight on the conflict. To do a research on genocide and politicide 
through the US point of view, we might understand the reasons behind their unrecognition of 
Al-Anfal being a genocide. This theme is relevant for the studies of peace and conflict, since 
it's related to human rights.      
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
After the introduction chapter, the structure of the thesis is the following:  
Chapter 2: A methodological chapter, where the research method is described.  
Chapter 3: A chapter where my analysis is presented.  
Chapter 4: Where the findings from the analysis is discussed.  












Within my master thesis, I have considered of doing a qualitative method to retrieve required 
data and information for my research. What’s considered to be important when doing a 
research is to obtain information that is valid and reliable, where we can make sure that the 
collected data can be matched with the research question, as well as it can be matched with 
reality. In this chapter of my master thesis, I will be focusing on my chosen field of 
methodology. 
 
2.1 Literature study 
When I had to start collecting data, there were some decisions that had to be made. I had to 
consider of either doing a quantitative or a qualitative method. Since my research is related to 
understanding different standpoints and definitions, it was more logical to choose a qualitative 
research method. That’s because qualitative method gives me the opportunity to study data in 
depth, where we will have the opportunity to study and analyse which factors played an 
important role regarding how the US considered the Al-Anfal conflict (Bryman, 2012; 
Thagaard, 2013). Of course, there are many different directions in a qualitative method, where 
some include interviews, while others are about doing a literature study, in which a researcher 
must collect, analyse and compare literature to answer a research question (Hart, 1998; 
Jesson, 2011). Since a literature study fits my research field, I chose to use a literature study 
based on published articles, books and other relevant documents.      
 
By choosing a literature study as a method, it will give me the opportunity to analyse different 
publications and articles, and this will give me the possibility of comparing and analysing 
information (Hart, 1998; Hart, 2018; Støren, 2011). When choosing a specific method, we 
must go through its strengths and weaknesses to understand what we are able to achieve, and 
it will make it easier for me to continue my path. When I tried to gather data by searching for 
relevant articles, I had difficulties in finding relevant data that mentions the reasons behind 
the US standpoint, which regards their recognition of Al-Anfal campaign being a politicide. 
On the bright side, I found relevant data about how states in general consider and translate the 
meaning of the Genocide Convention differently, in which it gives a different understanding 
of the term. 
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2.2 The searching process  
To collect data requires knowledge about the processes, and where I will be able to search to 
get the required information. When collecting data, I had to choose a valid and reliable 
searching engine which had to be recognized for its reliable sources. My option was to choose 
between different types of searching engines, in which I chose “Oria” and “Google Scholar” 
when going through the process. I chose “Oria” since it has a database within the University’s 
library webpage, that gives access to many articles, as well as books that can be ordered 
through the University’s library. When using the searching engine in “Oria”, I had to use 
specific terms within the searching engine to define what I’m focusing on finding, in which I 
searched for “Al-Anfal AND genocide” and “Al-Anfal AND politicide”. Here we will notice 
that “AND” with capital letters tells the searching engine that we are looking for literature 
which includes both terms. Searching after information that’s written in another language 
gave no limitation since I found relevant books that was written in Norwegian by searching 
for “folkemord i Irak”, which is translated into “genocide in Iraq”. By using this method, I 
had the opportunity to find books that contained information about Al-Anfal, and definitions 
regarding both politicide and genocide. After collecting the required information, I had to 
check if the sources were valid and reliable, no matter if they were collected from recognized 
websites. To do so, I had to compare the collected articles up to other research articles to find 
out about their reliability, while I had to check if the information that is showed in the article 
is based on reality to know whether it’s valid or not.  
 
Another searching engine that has been used is “Google Scholar”, where I had the opportunity 
to find many other relevant articles. By using “Google Scholar” I found many articles that 
came from unknown sources, which made me sceptical, and I had to go through every single 
article to find out about whether if it’s valid and reliable, compared to other articles. A list of 
my searching keywords in both Oria and Google Scholar, are the following: 
 
- “The Anfal campaign” 
- Anfal AND genocide 
- Al-Anfal AND genocide 
- Anfal AND politicide 
- Iraq AND genocide 
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- Iraq AND politicide 
- Iraq AND genocide AND politicide 
- Al-Anfal AND USA 
- folkemord i Irak 
- genocide and politicide 
 
By collecting and reading different articles and books, I had the opportunity to see references 
that were used by scholars who wrote their articles. By collecting their references, I had the 
chance to find more literature regarding Al-Anfal, and the US perspective on the conflict. 
This made it more possible to find different opinions and drafts regarding the research 
question, which gave a deeper understanding of the situation when it came to the US, as well 
as the Iraqi regime and the Kurds.  
 
When searching in Oria, I focused on choosing articles that were peer reviewed, because it 
would be a measure to ensure that my data material consist of articles with high quality. 
Likewise, the publisher of a book can be a way of uncovering credibility (Booth et al., 2016; 
Dalland & Trygstad, 2012). After choosing literature based on its quality, I read through the 
references of books and articles. This is important to find relevant information, which could 
be included.   
 
2.3 Data material 
Based on my searching process, I chose to have the following literature as my data material: 
 
Author  Title  Type of literature  Content  
Baser & Toivanen 
(2017) 





the post-Saddam era  
Article, published in 
Journal of Genocide 
Research  
It describes the 
reasons for 
recognising Al-Anfal 
to be a genocide, and 




Bruinessen (1992)  Agha, Shaikh and 
State. The Social and 
Political Structures 
of Kurdistan 
Book, published by 
Zed Books 
This book was used 
as an introduction to 
Kurdistan and the 
Kurds 
Bruinessen (1994)  Genocide in 
Kurdistan?: The 
Suppression of the 
Dersim Rebellion in 
Turkey (1937-38) 
and the Chemical 
War Against the 
Iraqi Kurds (1988) 










how to categorize 
the campaign 
through looking at 
the Iragi regimes 
intention.    
Harff (2003) No Lessons Learned 
from the Holocaust? 
Assessing Risks of 
Genocide and 
Political Mass 
Murder since 1955 




Gives an definition 
of politicide and 
genocide, and use 
the Al-Anfal as an 
example of 
politicide.  
Hiltermann (1994) Bureaucracy of 
Repression: The 
Iraqi Government in 
Its Own Words  





documents related to 
the Al-Anfal 
campaign.  
   
Hiltermann (2007)  A Poisonous Affair: 
America, Iraq, and 
the Gassing of 
Halabja  
Book, published by 
Cambridge 
University Press 
Contributed to the 
understanding of 
USA actions during 
the Al-Anfal.  
Hiltermann (2008) The 1988 Anfal 
Campaign in Iraqi 
Kurdistan 
Article, published by 
Online Encyclopedia 
of Mass Violence 




Johns (n.d.) The Crimes of 
Saddam Hussein: 
1988 The Anfal 
Campaign 
Article, published by 
Frontline  
A summary of Al-
Anfal  
Kaveh (2014) Folkemord i 











Kelly (2005) The Tricky Nature of 
Proving Genocide 
against Saddam 
Hussein before the 
Iraqi Special 
Tribunal 
Article, published by 
Cornell International 
Law Journal 
Discussion of the 
difficulties of 
categorizing Al-




MacDowall (2000) A Modern History of 
the Kurds  
Book, published by 
I.B. Tauris  
Thorough account of 
Kurdish history 
Middle East Watch 
(1993) 
Genocide in Iraq: 
The Anfal Campaign 
Against the Kurds. 




timeline of Al-Anfal, 
and the developing 
conflict between 
Kurds and the Iraqi 
regime. Based on 
their research, the 
book recognises Al-
Anfal to be a 
genocide. 
Montgomery (2001) The Iraqi Secret 
Police Files: A 
Documentary 
Record of the Anfal 
Genocide 
Article, published by 
Archivaria. 
It’s relevant since it 
mentions the link 
between Al-Anfal 








published by The 
Guardian  
News article who 
covered the trial 
after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein   
Power (2002) “A Problem from 
Hell”: America and 
the Age of 
Genocide. 
Book, published by 
Harper Perennial 
Describes different 
kinds of genocide, 
including the Al-
Anfal campaign in 
Iraq. 
Saeedpour (1992) Establishing State 
Motives for 






violations made by 
the Iraqi regime 
against the Kurdish 
population. 
Trahan (2009) A Critical Guide to 
the Iraqi High 
Tribunal’s ANFAL 
judgment: Genocide 
against the Kurds. 
An article, published 
in Michigan Journal 
of International Law. 
This article shows 
the convictions on 
former high officials 
in Iraq. 
Tripp (2007) A History of Iraq Book, published by 
Cambridge 
University Press  
Introduction to Iraqi 
history  





Justice through EU 
Recognition 
Paper, published by 
EU  
UNPO & the 
Kurdish Regional 
Government appeals 
to the EU in an 
attempt to get them 
to recognize Al-





2.4 Triangulation  
Since the literature study involves comparing and studying relevant data against each other to 
find an answer to our research question, I therefore had to focus on measures, to be able to 
evaluate different sources’ validity and reliability. Through this method, I will have the 
possibility to read a document, as well as comparing it to the researchers’ background, which 
includes obtaining their standpoints. Such examples could be that there is a higher probability 
of an individual with a Kurdish background of considering the campaign to be a genocide, 
while other scientists from other backgrounds might have a different opinion (Dalland & 
Trygstad, 2012).  
 
Therefore, the focus of my master thesis, will regard reasons behind the US standpoint, and 
the causes for unrecognising Al-Anfal campaign to be a genocide. There are many opinions, 
reasons and perspectives behind their point of view, and I will mostly focus on their 
standpoint that affects their decisions. Because of the opportunity of obtaining reliable 
sources, it will be possible to compare them, and get the same answers, which will help us 
through triangulation, to find an answer to my research question (Bryman, 2012).  
 
Through my explanation of the method, we will understand that the thesis will consist of 
triangulation, which derives from literature study, where it will consist of examining different 
scientists’ standpoints regarding why the US looks at Al-Anfal conflict differently compared 
to other western states. Triangulation as a method, is associated with using different methods 
to check and compare the validity, as well as the reliability of the collected data. In my case it 
will be about obtaining and comparing different sources with each other (Bryman, 2012, p. 
392). By using this method, I will have the opportunity of comparing if there are many 
scientists who has the same opinion regarding the conflict, or if there happens to be different 
opinions and standpoints. When there occur different understandings of the situation among 
researchers, it will be important to compare their reliability, as well as their background. If we 
notice that some of the scientists show through their work strong signs of personal opinions, 
we can say that it will show weaknesses, especially when it comes to its objectivity. We must 
therefore exclude these kinds of articles from our research. Triangulation wouldn’t only help 
by removing unreliable sources, it will also give me a deeper and a greater understanding of 
the field, by comparing and analysing different opinions, perspectives and documents. 
22 
 
2.5 Genocide Convention 
We can see that my master thesis is related to international laws, human rights and especially 
the subject area of Al-Anfal campaign, which regards USAs political standpoint, especially 
when it comes to whether Al-Anfal is to be considered a politicide or a genocide. Therefore, I 
will be focusing on mentioning an international convention. The most important convention is 
“the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” from 9th of 
December 1948, which is known as “the Genocide Convention” (Genocide Convention, 
1948).  
 
2.6 Methodological reflection 
The reliability of the thesis is related to the project’s credibility and whether the 
methodological implementation is reliable (Thagaard, 2013, p. 201). The validity on the other 
hand, deals with the interpretations made by the researcher (Thagaaard, 2013, p. 204). My 
data material consists of literature, which is expected to answer my research question and the 
supplementary question. It might be that there exist other relevant sources that haven’t been 
included in my thesis, but as long as I have answered my research question, this alone shows 
that I have an adequate data material. The chosen literature has been quality assured, which is 
an important measure in a literature study. These measures ensure my thesis’ reliability, as 
well as validity. The literature study has its interpretations based on literature, and my 










3 The Al-Anfal Campaign from an American perspective 
When we try to define genocide as a term, we will notice that there are weaknesses when it 
comes to the genocide convention. Events that are politically motivated, such as for example 
mass killings, are difficult to categorize as a genocide, and this can especially be related to a 
specific group of victims, who resists and defend their territory against the ideology of the 
current state. Because of their resistance, the state will usually respond back at the resisting 
group, in which their response would be a counterinsurgency. This is where the term 
politicide comes in, where the designation of it refers to special cases, in which the state 
responds back at the resisting group by making goals regarding the removal of the resisting 
group in any way, by using any kinds of tools (Harff, 2003, p. 58; Kaveh, 2014, p. 191). Such 
a situation could be related to the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein and his Baath party, 
where they implemented rules and performed a massacre against Kurds who were residents 
within the northern region of Iraq in 1988. The Iraqi army performed military operations, with 
a goal to exterminate every Kurd who were still living in the northern region. After 
performing the operations, the event was called Al-Anfal campaign (Kaveh, 2014, p. 191). In 
this chapter, I will present the information from the data material to examine the Al-Anfal 
campaign and USAs standpoint. I will start the chapter with historical background regarding 
Kurds and Iraq.    
 
3.1 Historical background of Kurds in Iraq 
To make it clearly, Kurdistan is the name used to refer to the land of Kurds, which is located 
geographically between the borders to Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. It’s said that the Kurds 
geographical location was decisive, when it came to the historical events that has happened in 
these areas (Kaveh, 2014, p. 192; McDowall, 2000). Here, we’ll see that Bruinessen mentions 
that “The inaccessibility of Kurdistan and the fierce warring capacities of its inhabitants have 
always made it a natural frontier of the empires that emerged around it” (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 
13). 
 
Throughout the Kurdish history, we will find many power factors, such as the Persian empire, 
who was followed by the Ottoman, who controlled areas, and became known as the Ottoman 
empire. These events were the reasons behind calling Kurds to be the so-called buffers in 
between empires. When the border war between the two empires ended in between 1514-1638 
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through a treaty called Zuhab, we will therefore see the treaty as the reason for the modern 
borders that exist between Turkey and Iran (Kaveh, 2014, p. 192; McDowall, 2000, pp. 25-
26).  
 
As we know, Kurds were known to be organized in different tribal federations and also in 
principalities, in which the last principalities of Kurds were liquidated between 1800-1900 by 
the Ottomans (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 176; Kaveh, 2014, p. 192). It's necessary to mention that 
the Kurds principalities were independent, especially when it comes to their political units 
that leads to the creation of alliances and partnerships against their enemies, including 
fighting different tribes in between them. The causes of such internal conflicts between Kurds, 
were caused because of disagreement due to political ideologies and interests. These were 
some of the main factors that lead them to divide and live in Iraq, Turkey and Syria right after 
world war one, when the Ottoman empire disintegrated to the so-called territorial divide 
between the borders of the earlier mentioned states (Kaveh, 2014, p. 192). 
 
When it came to the creation of an independent state for Kurds, it was mentioned by Sèvres 
agreement in 1920, the following: 
 
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish 
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council 
of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population 
of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers 
that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be 
granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to 
renounce all rights and title over these areas (Sèvres-agreement article 64, articles 62-
64, mentioned in Kaveh, 2014, p. 192). 
 
The Sèvres agreement from 1920, didn’t work, mainly because of disagreements and a weak 
cooperation among Kurds. Another important factor to mention is the colonial policy of the 




3.1.1 The Kurdish situation from 1932-1980 
Since the historical background of the Kurdish population have been mentioned earlier, which 
includes the impact they got from both the Ottoman and the Persian empire, it’s clear that the 
Ottoman empire who were on the losing side with the so-called Triple Alliance during world 
war one, had to refrain from many territories, because of settlement. After the Turkish 
liberation, which also describes their victory against western powers, that’s when Turkey 
declared in 1923, its independency, while provinces such as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul 
became a mandate for the Great Britain (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 275; Kaveh, 2014, p. 193).  
 
When the known provinces which are located in Iraq, became a mandate for the Great Britain, 
it was unknown what the British mandate in these areas would become, while they were 
unsure regarding where the borders would be placed. The Great Britain had some 
considerations regarding the establishment of an independent government for Kurds, that 
wouldn’t focus on materialization. Later on, Turkey came with requirements regarding these 
areas, until a new agreement was signed with the new unit in Iraq and Great Britain in 1926 
(Bruinessen, 1992, p. 275; Kaveh, 2014, p. 193).  
 
After the agreement, the British interest regarding the Kurdish areas became stronger, and 
especially after the discovery of resources such as oil in Kirkuk and Mosul. While some 
scholars agree upon the interest of the British becoming stronger after the discovery of oil in 
these areas, we will see that other scholars disagree, such as David McDowall, who rejected 
the theory regarding the British interest becoming stronger, while he explains that the main 
goal of the British was to either establish an independent state for the Kurdish population 
living within the northern region, or to incorporate them within a constructed state with other 
Arabs who lived in south, such as Shia and Sunni Arabs (Kaveh, 2014, p. 193; McDowall, 
2000, p. 135).  
 
Because of weak unity and disagreement among Kurds, as well as the interest of great powers 
in these areas, the result was to incorporate the Kurdish areas into the Iraqi state, which was 
established in year 1932 to become a kingdom (Kaveh, 2014, p. 193). The agreement upon 
incorporating the Kurdish areas, and the establishment of an Iraqi state didn’t work properly, 
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since many Kurdish tribes showed dissatisfaction and went to rebellion against the state 
multiple of times, in which one example could be under the power of Shaikh Mahmud, while 
a similar case refers to Shia Arabs who were also dissatisfied and rebelled against the Iraqi 
government (Kaveh, 2014, p. 193).  
 
We can through this say that the Iraqi state construction wasn’t stable, where many attempts 
of takeovers and coups were done between 1941-1968, in which by 1968 Ahmed Hassan al-
Bakr became a president right after the coup, who were followed after by the known president 
Saddam Hussein, who at first became the vice president through the so-called Baath party, 
until he took over the power in year 1979 (Kaveh, 2014, p. 193; Tripp, 2007). Similar to the 
earlier mentioned negotiations that happened with the Kurds, where they were promised to get 
local autonomy, including cultural rights through the autonomy agreement that was agreed 
upon in mars 1970, in which none of these promises were met (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 28; 
Kaveh, 2014, p. 193; McDowall, 2000; Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 5). Through the Kurds 
perspective we can clearly see that they went to negotiation when they had the opportunity, 
where the government by itself were able and willing to negotiate, and that Kurds rebelled 
and went to war at the governments’ weakest point when their negotiations, and promises 
weren’t met. The same situation applies to other states who also has Kurdish citizens (Kaveh, 
2014, p. 193).  
 
It’s therefore said that the main cause for the war, was due to the lack of following up the 
agreement from 1970, which caused the conflict to escalate between Kurds and the state in 
1974, where Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) lead a Kurdish movement, which received 
support by the USA and Iran, both economically and military (Kaveh, 2014, p. 193; 
McDowall, 2000). Because of the conflict between Kurds and the Iraqi state, we can see the 
formation of an agreement between Iraq and Iran in 1975, that goes under the name “Algier 
agreement”, that was related to horse trading, and to divide the river “Shatt al-Arab” between 





The Algier agreement included that Iran would cancel their support to the Kurdish movement 
in Iraq, which later led to the collapse of the Kurdish movement after an agreement between 
Iraq and Iran. This gave the Iraqi regime success in handling the situation, and dealing with 
the Kurdish movement, in which the Baath party became more ambitious about changing the 
demographic situation of Kurdistan (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 193-194). Their ambitions were the 
beginning of the Arabization policies, where many Kurds were forced to move away from the 
northern region of Iraq to move further south. Many villages such as Nineveh, Duhok and 
Diyala were obliterated. In doing so, their plan was to encourage Arabs to move to the 
northern region, by entice them with offers like governmental support, while Kurds who were 
forced to move from these northern areas, had to live in controlled camps (Kaveh, 2014, p. 
194). 
 
An important part from the Algier agreement between Iraq and Iran, was to guard their own 
borders, to ensure stabilization between both states. That was the main reason for the Iraqi 
regime to try to tidy its borders between 1977 and 1978, where all villages within the radius 
of thirty kilometres from the borders would be destroyed, and that all the residents of these 
areas would therefore be moved to other areas. Because of the process, the Iraqi regime 
attacked many villages, which included deporting many thousands of individuals from areas 
around the border in summer term 1978 (Kaveh, 2014, p. 194). They created collective 
villages, that were named “Mujamma’at”, that consisted of gathering places for all of the 
deported Kurds, as well as to whom have lost their homes. The Mujamma’at were built next 
to the roads that were strongly controlled by the Iraqi army, or next to central cities. These 
kinds of measures could be compared to the measures used in Al-Anfal by the government in 
1980 (Kaveh, 2014, p. 194).  
 
The earlier mentioned Algier agreement, that was made in 1975, caused a status quo, where 
Iraq, USA and Iran were satisfied with the conditions, which didn’t last for long because of 
the changes that were done in 1979, where the Islamic revolution that appeared in Iran 
changed the conditions. This impaired the alliance that Iran had with the USA and the west, 
because of the replacement of the shah, after the Islamic revolution that was done by 
Ayatollahs from Teheran. Saddam Hussein saw the Islamic revolution to be an opportunity 
for him to regain the river “Shatt al-Arab” that was refrained to Iran through the Algier 
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agreement, which is known to be the main cause for the eight years long gulf war from 1980 
to 1988. According to the CIA, it’s said that as a result of the war, many lost their lives, where 
around 500.000 Iranians died, while on the other hand we can see that around 250.000 Iraqis 
lost their lives (Hiltermann, 1994; Kaveh, 2014, p. 194).  
 
The war between Iran and Iraq, led the Iraqi regime to concentrate more on the conflict, 
where the presence of the army within Kurdistan Iraq were reduced. This gave the Kurdish 
Peshmerga, which is a Kurdish guerrilla, the opportunity of reopening the fight (Kaveh, 2014, 
p. 194). Here, we can see that the Kurds functioned as buffers within earlier conflicts, as well 
as in gulf war, where Kurds who lived within the northern region of Iraq, got their support 
from a foreign country, in which this time they got their support from the so-called post-
revolutionary Iran, while after the rebellion loss of Kurds in 1975, the Kurdish Patriotic Union 
(PUK) was created by Jalal Talibani. This time the Iraqi regime had to be ready for two 
rebellious groups who was led by both PUK and KDP, whom afterwards created an alliance 
with Iran in 1987, which was called Kurdistan National Front (Kaveh, 2014, p. 194; 
McDowall, 2000, p. 351). 
 
3.2 The forbidden villages 
Towards the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the Baath party in Iraq implemented a campaign against 
every single Kurd who stayed in the northern region of Iraq. This campaign consisted of 
military actions, in which it was called Al-Anfal, a term taken from the holy book Quran, 
where the chapter is taken from, mentions how to fight infidels who are against Islam. The 
expression by itself makes it clear for us how the Baath party perceived the Kurdish 
population. The Quranic chapter describes how Muslims can demand to get assets and goods 
from infidels, after murdering them. We can therefore say that the Iraqi regime used the 
Quranic verse as a form of propaganda to call Kurds for infidels to get the fully support from 
their Arab population. This gave them the potential to use every tool they had, including 
chemical weapons against Kurds. That’s when the regime started to arrest Kurdish residents, 
burn villages and to gather Kurds together in specific gathering places before some of them 
got executed and buried in mass graves (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 194-195; Middle East Watch, 1993, 




It was explained by the Iraqi regime that their motivation was based on preventing villages 
within the northern region to become a base for Peshmerga to recruit new members. That was 
their argumentation for attacking and destroying around 4049 villages. A known non-
governmental organization called Middle East Watch estimated that around 100.000 
individuals disappeared during Al-Anfal (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 194-195; Middle East Watch, 
1993, p. 13). 
 
The campaign started in 1987, when Saddam Hussein chose Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid al-
Tikrit who is today known as “the chemical ali” to become a governor for the province in 
north Iraq, which of course is a region that consist of Kurds as the majority, but also with 
minor ethnicities and religions such as Assyrian Christians and Yazidi (Kaveh, 2014, p. 195; 
Middle East Watch, 1993). Middle East Watch claims that to the Kurds, Husseins cousin also 
goes under the name “Ali Anfal”, and he is pointed out as “the overlord of the Kurdish 
genocide” (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 3). When Al-Majid received his authorization, and 
got the opportunity to give orders to governmental institutions that were under his disposition, 
he ordered in summer 1987, that northern areas where Kurds lived would suddenly become 
forbidden for them to be live in (Kaveh, 2014, p. 195). It was vindicated in regulations that 
“Within their jurisdiction, the armed forces must kill any human being or animal present 
within these areas. They are totally prohibited” (Hiltermann, 1994, p. 68, mentioned in Kaveh, 
2014, p. 195). 
 
Shortly after, Al-Majid came with another presumption, where it was said that the regulation 
has been sharpened, in which the army was ordered to attack randomly with the air force and 
artilleries at all times which was described as follows: “in order to kill the largest number of 
persons present [in] those prohibited areas” (Hiltermann, 1994, p. 72, mentioned in Kaveh, 
2014, p. 195). There were also other orders regarding capturing any individual who were 
caught to be living in these villages, where in this situation they would be detained, 
questioned by the intelligence service and executed right after the interrogation if they were 
aged between 15 and 70. These presumptions were the foundations for the military activity 




3.3 The timeline of Al-Anfal 
According to Kaveh (2014, p. 195) and Power (2002, p. 172), when it comes to Al-Anfal, it’s 
mentioned that the military campaign consisted of eight phases (Kaveh, 2014, p. 195; Power, 
2002, p. 172). All the events occurred within the same pattern, in which the most offensive 
event started through the Iraqi regime by using chemical weapons as well as the air force to 
attack Peshmerga that consisted of individuals who came from either PUK or KDP, as well as 
civilians. Afterwards, the Iraqi regime managed to surround the areas by cooperating with the 
Jash, which is a term used by Kurds to describe Kurds who worked with the Iraqi 
government, where they were seen by Kurds as traitors (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 195-196; Power, 
2002, p. 202). When translating to clearly understand the term “Jash”, it will be revealed that 
it means a little donkey, where they officially were called National Defense Battalions, while 
the role of the term “Jash” specifically under the Al-Anfal was ambivalent. That’s why we 
can argue that the Jash assisted the regime in arresting, as well as deporting Kurds, at the 
same time as they helped saving many lives, and supported Peshmerga by giving them 
weapon supplies (Kaveh, 2014, p. 196; McDowall, 2000).   
 
Further on, the demolition of the so-called settlement areas was still going, while many 
individuals were arrested within the specific area, and were transported to a gathering place, 
that was described by the regime to be a modern village for Kurds (Kaveh, 2014, p. 196; 
Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 38). It becomes obvious that every event that’s related to Al-
Anfal I-VII, targets specific areas that are located next to the Iranian borders, which was of 
course controlled by PUK. It’s therefore said that the eight phase of Al-Anfal was done 
against the oppositions located within the northern area to the borders next to Turkey, which 
was known to be influenced by the KDP. It’s therefore important to clarify these different 
stages within the campaign (Kaveh, 2014, p. 196). 
 
3.3.1 The first Al-Anfal (23th February – 19th Mars 1988) 
When looking at the different phases of the Al-Anfal campaign, we will see that the first event 
occurred in 23th of February (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 10), where PUKs headquarters 
that were located in Bergalou and Sergalou were bombed with what is mentioned to be 
conventional weapons. The first phase also covers the gas attack that has been done in 
Halabja, which has attracted lots of attention by the international media (Kaveh, 2014, p. 196; 
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Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 10). Even if the US vetoed, when the United Nations wanted to 
condemn Iraq for Al-Anfal, Dave Johns argues that the attack on Halabja was considered to 
be a separate attack, which occurred outside the prohibited areas of Al-Anfal. According to 
Johns, Halabja could be referred to as a crime against humanity, and could be a separate case, 
instead of being included in Al-Anfal (Johns, n.d., last paragraph). 
  
It has been mentioned that an estimation between four thousand to seven thousand individuals 
were killed during the Halabja attack, while the Middle East Watch argued that around 3000 
deaths could be the correct estimation (Kaveh, 2014, p. 196; Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 27). 
Like Johns (n.d.), Kaveh also argues that the Halabja attack was excluded from the campaign, 
which only focused on the rural of Kurdistan. No matter if the Peshmerga were exposed to the 
chemical attack that occurred in 1987, it’s still said that the attack on Halabja was 
demoralizing. Because of the demoralized attack by the Iraqi regime, Halabja were seen as 
collective retribution which was made against civilians by the regime. This attack wouldn’t be 
the last, in which the regime repeated its gas attacks, where it was documented that over an 
amount of forty attacks were done (Kaveh, 2014, p. 196; Middle East Watch, 1993). 
  
Hiltermann argues that the use of chemical weapons was effective on removing the Iranian 
assaults, as well as removing Kurdish guerrilla from the countryside. What strengthens the 
theory regarding the cooperation between peshmerga and the Iranians in year 1988, is 
explained by Hiltermann, where he states that the PUK got used to the chemical attacks, and 
received equipments, such as gas masks from Iran (Hiltermann, 2008, p. 5). The tactic of Al-
Anfal was to attack those who were allies with the enemy “Iran”, in which it targeted PUK, 
while the Kurdish civilians had the opportunity to get moved to gathering places (Hiltermann, 
2008, p. 6). 
 
3.3.2 The second Al-Anfal (22nd March – 1st April 1988) 
While this attack was considered to be the first attack within the Al-Anfal campaign, it was 
mentioned that the second event occurred within 22nd of March until 1st of April 1988, which 
was considered to be shorter compared to the first event. The second phase of the campaign 
was mainly focusing on the geography, where it was aiming at the region of Qara Dagh. Here, 
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the regime started by attacking with their air force against the Seyw Senan village on 22nd of 
March, where they continued against Dukan the day after, while on the evening they would 
put the ground forces into these areas. This resulted in many civilians fleeing from the area. 
When comparing the second phase of the campaign with the forthcoming phases, we can 
notice that the second phase differentiates, because it didn’t have any systematics within the 
military to handle the fleeing civilians. Some of those fleeing civilians sought shelter within 
Suleimania, and in villages that were located next to highways, which was seen to be a good 
decision afterwards (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 196-197; Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 118). The parts 
of those who moved to Suleimania, and especially children and women, had the opportunity 
to survive, while the other part that decided to flee to other areas such as to the Germiyan 
region were vanished without a trace (Kaveh, 2014, p. 197). 
 
3.3.3 The third Al-Anfal (7th April – 20th April 1988) 
Here, we will see that the third phase of the campaign was focused on the Germiyan region, 
which consisted of areas that were less favourable to the guerrilla warfare, rather than the 
region called Qara Dagh, or the valley of Jafati which were both targets for the regimes 
previous military operations. Regardless of the strategic disadvantage, the Kurdish resistance 
was organized with a strong local support, and especially within the Germiyan, since it 
belonged to the heartland of the PUK (Kaveh, 2014, p. 197). Here, we can see a description 
from one survivor who lived in Kani Qader, who said the following: 
 
The peshmerga had ordered each family to buy one weapon […] It was like a law, and 
the people agreed with this because they saw it necessary. The armed civilians would 
join the peshmerga in the defense of their villages. They were referred to as the 
«backing force». All the villages had this type of civil defense unit. (Middle East 
Watch, 1993, p. 130, mentioned in Kaveh, 2014, p. 197). 
 
The Kurdish local defence worked to respond to the attempt made by the regime to defeat 
them. It’s described that the nature of oppression and war has changed drastically, where the 
regime showed another demonstration of its power by surrounding the whole area of 
Germiyan with the army, which showed the civilians that the local support won’t help, and 
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that there would be no point in resisting anymore. At this point, the army didn’t leave the area 
before arresting certain kind of individuals who were involved in resisting and attacking the 
army, and took the rest of the civilians and moved them to different gathering places that were 
spread across the region, in which their personal information were collected at their arrival to 
the gathering places, as well as separating men from their families (Kaveh, 2014, p. 197; 
Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 152). In addition to Kurds who were arrested and later on moved 
to gathering places, there were some who voluntarily wanted to move to a gathering place, in 
which there are many reasons behind their voluntarily choice (Kaveh, 2014, p. 197; Middle 
East Watch, 1993, p. 154). For some of them, who decided to move voluntarily, it was 
because of their naïve understanding of what has occurred recently, couldn’t be different from 
the last historical attacks. They also feared being caught being inside the illegal areas which 
could result in a death penalty. Therefore, one of the causes for them to voluntarily move to 
gathering places was the destruction and terror that could have a contributing affect (Kaveh, 
2014, p. 197).  
 
Some of the most important reasons for these civilians to surrender themselves to the Iraqi 
regime, was the amnesty, which means that they would be pardoned for their past offenses, 
which was of course something important for the civilians. These kinds of amnesty were used 
by the regime many times, where the agreement was broken (Kaveh, 2014, p. 197; Middle 
East Watch, 1993). When it comes to the third Al-Anfal, it’s said that it was different from the 
rest of the phases, except from villages along the area called Little Zab under the fourth Al-
Anfal, where children and women vanished. It was mostly males aged between 15-70, who 
lost their lives within Germiyan, while children and women were also killed in the southern 
parts of Germiyan. It’s problematic to find an answer to the reason behind these kinds of 
actions, while one explanation could be that it has to do with the extent of Kurdish resistance 
that the Iraqi regime had to go through (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 197-198; Middle East Watch, 1993, 
p. 121). 
  
It could be that the main reason behind the killing of children and women by the Iraqi army is 
because of the probability of them being involved in supporting the Peshmerga in resisting the 
army. This can be a good explanation since the case in other places weren’t the same, in 
which the meeting between Peshmerga and the army wasn’t harsh (Kaveh, 2014, p 198; 
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Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 121). That’s why the actions of killing both children and women 
could be explained by saying that the regime did it as a revenge against the civilians who 
supported Peshmerga, and that this is the reason behind the killing of over 10.000 individuals 
in southern Germiyan (Kaveh, 2014, p. 198; Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 170).  
 
3.3.4 The fourth Al-Anfal (3rd May – 8th May 1988) 
When moving on to the Al-Anfal IV, which occurred in between 3rd of May and 8th of May 
1988, we can see that the target of the fourth phase was the so-called Little Zab, where the 
army was harsher while attacking, since Iran had taken over Fao-peninsula (Kaveh, 2014, p. 
198; Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 171). This event consisted of chemical attacks on Askar and 
Goktapa, despite army reports, which regarded the harsh resistance from the Peshmerga, the 
army successfully regained the area. This resulted in visible damages that were done to Little 
Zab, while the civilians who fled under the attack were spread around the area (Kaveh, 2014, 
p. 198; Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 177).  
 
3.3.5 The fifth to seventh Al-Anfal (15th May – 26th August 1988) 
The fifth to the seventh Al-Anfal occurred between 15th of May and 26th of August 1988, 
where all the phases focused on targeting the same specific area which was located in the 
mountain areas in Rawanduz and Shaqlawa. It’s therefore said that the PUK were pushed 
away from their traditional places because of Al-Anfal, where their influence would be at 
their strongest. That’s why the fifth phase began within the valleys of Balisan, which was 
known in that time to be sparsely populated (Kaveh, 2014, p. 198; Middle East Watch, 1993, 
p. 193).  
 
Because of it, the priority of the army wasn’t to move civilians under this phase, but rather to 
force and push the Peshmerga to move forward to the northern area, in which the army would 
regain their control. It was clearly mentioned that when the army initiated its operation, the 
area was empty, in which this could be related to the earlier events that has happened, such as 
the chemical attack that was done in autumn 1987, which could have a connection to the 
escape of the people. It’s also important to mention that the regime also displaced the Kurdish 
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population from that territory before the beginning of 1980 (Kaveh, 2014, p. 198; Middle East 
Watch, 1993, p. 194). 
 
As mentioned before, since Peshmerga have got their support in the form of supplies in 
advance, their position was strengthened, in which they didn’t have to be concerned about the 
civilians security within the territory, just like they were forced to in the past through the 
earlier phases of Al-Anfal. Because of the strong resistance by the Peshmerga, the Iraqi army 
had difficulties in attacking and regaining control in the territory, where they had to try and 
attack with two attempts before succeeding to gain control over it. Since the army had to do 
multiple of attempts to gain control, it was therefore named the sixth and the seventh phases 
of Al-Anfal (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 198-199). The politics, and the military strategy of the regime 
during the fifth until the seventh phase, were all similar compared to the phases that has 
occurred earlier, where we would see the same patterns, such as gathering Kurds into 
temporarily gathering places, transporting military vehicles to Kirkuk, and arrestations 
(Kaveh, 2014, pp. 198-199; Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 200). 
 
What made these phases special compared to earlier phases, was the direct involvement of 
Saddam Hussein with the military operations at the time when it was made clear that the army 
was near victory. Within the last three months where the operations were going on, it was 
clear that a type of new development took place, in which the president of Iran Ali Khamenei 
sent a message and informed the international organization “The United Nations” to make 
them aware of their acceptance to the so-called earlier resolution that could in return end the 
war, but that on the other side was against the agreement they had with KDP and PUK, where 
the deal regarded that neither of the actors would stop or prevent the war with the Iraqi 
regime, without the permission of each other (Kaveh, 2014, p. 199; Middle East Watch, 
1993). 
 
3.3.6 The eight Al-Anfal (25th August – 6th September 1988) 
Since the timeline of the Al-Anfal phases were mentioned, we can move on to talk about the 
last and final phase that’s called Al-Anfal VIII, that occurred between 25th of August to 6th of 
September, where it was initiated after the truce agreement between both countries Iraq and 
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Iran (Kaveh, 2014, p. 199; Hiltermann, 1994). It’s therefore said that the regime didn’t find 
the last phase to be important to name it after anything, and they chose to name the last 
operation for the final Al-Anfal. The final phase of Al-Anfal was limited to the area of 
Badinan, which is located within the northern region of Iraq next to the borders to Turkey. 
Since the war between Iran and Iraq ended, the Iraqi regime decided to release the army, and 
sent them to implement the final Al-Anfal, where they encountered difficulties in regaining 
control over territories (Kaveh, 2014, p. 199). A general from the Iraqi army described the 
situation, and what the military has encountered by mentioning the following: 
 
The land is generally hilly with a hard terrain in its northern and eastern parts which 
lie parallel to the border line of Iraq and Turkey […] This area has many rivers and 
valleys which run from the north and east towards the south and west, forming the 
streams. The movement of the forces and machinery is greatly hindered by the series 
of mountains, high knolls, valleys and other obstacles (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 
262, mentioned in Kaveh, 2014, p. 199).  
 
Here we can see that compared to the other phases, the final phase differentiates itself in 
which respective tribes who lived in these areas had the opportunity to sign a peace 
agreement, where they insured that they didn’t allow Peshmerga to enter their village, and 
through this agreement they saved many villages from getting destructed. This agreement 
didn’t include areas that were controlled by KDP, in which they had over five thousand armed 
Peshmerga. It was mentioned by Kaveh (2014) that more than 200.000 forces were sent to 
Badinan by al-Majid, where the specific attacks have been coordinated, in which all of the 
events occurred at the same time within different areas, and lead to a massive flow of 
refugees. When comparing the flow of refugees to the past attack on Halabja, we can see 
similarities, where this time, the flow of refugees drew the attention of the international 
media, and especially when the Peshmerga soldiers left and deserted their military posts. One 
of the soldiers of Peshmerga described the situation as the following (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 199-




I could not find any of my fellow peshmerga. They had all gone to help their relatives, 
and the chemical weapons had created a lot of fear among the people. We did not 
know how to fight them. We knew how to fight tanks, how to chase a military caravan 
until we ambushed it, and how to escape aerial bombardements. But we did not know 
how to fight chemicals (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 276). 
 
We could through this see that the description of Peshmerga was similar to the response of 
KDP, where the decision was made to give up on resisting against the Iraqi army, since it 
won’t help them with anything if the army decides to use chemical weapons. Many of the 
refugees who fled to and got accepted to enter Turkey, explained the situation and told their 
experiences to the journalists who interviewed them, where they said that many of the fleeing 
refugees who were unlucky and couldn’t make it to the borders were killed by the army, 
similar to the ways that were used under the other operations of Al-Anfal. Even when many 
mass executions have been done under Al-Anfal phase VIII, the Middle East Watch couldn’t 
find any survivors who have witnessed the situation (Kaveh, 2014, p. 200; Middle East 
Watch, 1993). Compared to Al-Anfal III, we can see that in Al-Anfal III there were around 
six survivors of the campaign, who told their stories. One of the survivors who was 
interviewed by the Middle East Watch, said that:  
 
We received orders to kill all peshmerga, even those who surrendered […] Even 
civilian farmers were regarded as peshmerga if they were working within a prohibited 
area. All men in the prohibited areas, aged from 15-60 [sic], were to be considered 
saboteurs and killed (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 283, mentioned in Kaveh, 2014, p. 
200).  
 
It was therefore not an order to kill anyone on the spot. Despite this, such killings occurred, 
where one example could be the liquidation in both villages: Margeti and Koreme (Kaveh, 




3.4 Iraq’s human rights violation 
There are a number of disagreements with the USA, regarding the Al-Anfal campaign, where 
Middle East Watch (1993) explains the human rights violations during the campaign, with the 
following: “mass summary executions and mass disappearance of many tens of thousands of 
non-combatants, including large numbers of women and children, and sometimes the entire 
population of villages” (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 4). 
 
One of the reasons behind other states disagreeing with the USA, was because the decision of 
attacking, and executing civilians was against human rights. Through the first violation we 
can see that mass executions of innocent people who weren’t involved in neither politics or 
with cooperation with Iran, were targeted. Therefore, the lives of innocent civilians were lost 
because of this campaign (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 4). Especially when the Iraqi army 
targeted a whole village. Another important violation was “the widespread use of chemical 
weapons, including mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, against the town of Halabja 
as well as dozens of Kurdish villages, killing many thousands of people, mainly women and 
children” (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 4). Their irresponsible usage of chemical weapons led 
to the killing of thousands of Kurds, in which many of them were children and women. One 
way of understanding this situation is that their excuse of using chemical weapon only to 
defend themselves cannot fit in this situation. This makes it clear that there were other goals 
behind using chemical weapons than just defending themselves. 
 
It was mentioned by Middle East Watch (1993) another violation against human rights, which 
regards: 
 
forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers upon the demolition of their 
homes, their release from jail or return from exile; these civilians were trucked into 
areas of Kurdistan far from their homes and dumped there by the army with only 
minimal governmental compensation or none at all for their destroyed property, or any 
provision for relief, housing, clothing or food, and forbidden to return to their villages 
of origin on pain of death. In these conditions, many died within a year of their forced 
displacement (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. 5). 
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Through the occurrences we can see that the Iraqi government had violated the human rights 
of the Kurds within the northern region. But what’s challenging is to find any evidence, which 
shows that the army were targeting all Kurds. When studying the conflict carefully, we will 
see that the Al-Anfal campaign occurred after the intervention of the Kurds, who supported 
and helped Iran under the conflict between Iraq and Iran. This created fear, in which 
Hussein’s solutions weren’t peaceful but rather violent. His use of power was to terrify the 
Kurds, and to attack those who were involved. Since the conflict was political, it’s difficult to 
put the conflict under the category of genocide. Even when there were violations against the 
human rights where many civilians were killed, we can say that the government had to get 
punished for its violations. Through research, there were no evidence of the Baath party or 
Saddam Hussein ordering the army to kill all Kurds, since there were Kurds who worked 
within the government, as well as in the Iraqi army in that time. We will notice that the 
conflict will be more directed towards politicide, rather than genocide (Kaveh, 2014; Middle 
East Watch, 1993).  
 
Another scholar called Saeedpour (1992) argues that the chemical attack on the Kurdish 
population is interpreted to be a retribution by the Iraqi regime, because of Kurds’ 
engagement and cooperation with Iran under the Iraq-Iran war. Washington Times quoted a 
statement coming from the Amnesty International’s London headquarters in 9th of September 
1988, in which it said that:  
 
The mass killings are part of a systematic and deliberate policy by the Iraqi 
government to eliminate large number of Kurds . . . as a punishment for their imputed 
political sympathies and in retaliation for the activities of opposition Kurdish forces 
(Saeedpour, 1992, p. 60).  
 
Through this quote, Saeedpour tries to explain that the gas attack that occurred in autumn 
1988, couldn’t be interpreted to be a reaction to the rebellion, where Kurds allied with Iran 
under the conflict, but rather as a final phase where the Iraqi government planned to 
permanently remove all Kurds for both strategic and economic reasons. Saeedpour (1992) 
describes that one of the important things to examine was the geographical pattern related to 
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the attacks to have the opportunity to justify states actions. A report from the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee staff identified that the areas which were targeted by the chemical 
weapons, were connected to the areas that were redrawn within a map that was prepared and 
contained in the Kurdish Library. It’s explained that the primary motives for the Iraqi 
government to attack this specific region, which had a connection with the earlier mentioned 
report. The specific targeted areas were Zakho, Dihuk and Amadiya, in which all three 
facilities were important for the Iraqi government due to two major highways to Turkey and 
Syria, and the oil pipeline that’s between Turkey and Iraq. Since the Iraqi government were 
dependent of the sources and the geographical location that connects them to both Turkey and 
Syria, this might be a strong reason behind their chemical attacks on Kurds (Saeedpour, 1992, 
pp. 60-61). Just like the rest of the scholars, we will find that Saeedpour also agrees upon the 
massive abuses regarding the human rights of the Kurds, where she mentions a report from 
Amnesty International, which shows “the abduction of three hundred children and youths 
from the city of Sulaimania by the authorities in an effort to force their relatives in the 
Kurdish resistance to surrender” (Saeedpour, 1992, p. 64).  
 
Roger Baldwin, who works for the International League for Human Rights, created a 
statement to Kurt Waldheim who was at that time United Nations Secretary-General, in which 
he said that “The enclosed information evidences executions, instances of torture, mass 
detentions and the deportation of tens of thousands of Kurdish people in an apparent effort to 
destroy the Kurdish ethnic group” (Saeedpour, 1992, p. 68).  From this perspective, it’s clear 
that the Iraqi regime has violated the Genocide Convention, where it violated international 
protocols, which are against weapons such as poison gas (Saeedpour, 1992, p. 69). 
 
3.5 The Reasons behind the implementation of these operations 
After the American invasion on Iraq in 2003, and when the American army succeed in 
capturing Saddam Hussein (Tripp, 2007), he was then arrested and putted on trial. During this 
period he had to explain himself to the judge regarding Al-Anfal to defend himself and his 
Baath party for their earlier actions (Oliver, 2006). Under Saddam Husseins trial, it was 
mentioned by Oliver (2006) that the co-defendents of Saddam Hussein, told the Iraqi court 
under Saddams trial that the Iraqi army only attacked Kurdish rebels and Iranian soldiers who 
fought together against the Iraqi regime. A commander for the Anfal task force, who also 
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were under trial said for his defence that their goal was to only fight armed and organized 
armies, in which civilians weren’t targeted. Another defendant called Sabir al-Douri who was 
a director for the military intelligence explained that their aim was to remove and clear the 
northern region of Iraq from Iranian troops. He also stated that every civilian who lived within 
the Anfal region, were removed to safety (Oliver, 2006, paragraph 4-6). 
 
When looking at the campaign, we will notice that the Al-Anfal doesn’t stand out, when 
compared to the attempt of the Baath regime to change the demography within the northern 
region, which has also occurred in 1968, after the coup. The Baath party started to Arabize 
areas that were rich in resources such as oil, before the outbreak, such as Khanaqin and 
Kirkuk, while many Kurds were forced to move to the southern areas of Iraq in 1974 (Kaveh, 
2014, p. 200; Bruinessen, 1994, p. 159). This was the strategy of the regime to give the 
opportunity to let the Iraqi Arabs to move to the northern region. This was their plan to 
change the demographical situation in the country, where they initiated a so-called cleaning of 
the borders at the end of 1970s. These kinds of measurements and goals that focuses on 
demographical homogenization isn’t a new phenomenon, neither within the Iraqi regime, nor 
when comparing it to other states who have Kurdish citizens. Such an example could be 
Turkey, a country that has its border to Iraq, where many Kurds live, and where they had 
strict rules regarding Kurds both after and during World War I, where they were forcibly 
deported from eastern areas of the country, as well as moved (Kaveh, 2014, p. 200).  
 
When examining the reasons behind these strict policies in Turkey, it will be clear that it was 
because Turks feared that the Kurdish tribes would create an alliance with the Russian army, 
similarly to the event in Iraq, where the Kurds created an cooperation with Iran at the same 
time as the Gulf war. Similar to the situation in Iraq, where the Iraqi regime was motivated to 
attack and destroy villages, to Arabize and change the demographical situation, we will see 
that it’s laying economic reasons behind the Turks deporting policies. Kaveh (2014) mentions 
that because the Turkish Kurds were known to be semi-nomadic, the Turks felt that it was 
therefore important to make them live in a permanent residence, to have the opportunity of 
taxing. This wasn’t the only reason, and there were other nationalistic agendas, where the 
Turks wanted to remove language and the culture of Kurds from Turkey, in which the term 
assimilation could be used (Kaveh, 2014, p. 201).  
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Compared to the situation in Turkey, we can argue that the Al-Anfal campaign wasn’t 
focusing on assimilating or motivating to remove Kurds culture and language from the nation, 
but they did rather only target villages (Kaveh, 2014, p. 201). For Turkey, the ethnicity and 
territoriality were two related concepts, where they said that the territoriality of Kurds must 
slit. We can therefore say the same about the measures from the Iraqi regime, which regards 
deportation and Arabization of Kurds from the northern region. Through this, the motivation 
of the regime for the policies related to Arabization in the 1970s was a conflict regarding 
territory, and that doesn’t exclude their oil interest. Even when security was the top priority of 
the Iraqi regime in the 1970s, we will notice that the considerations regarding the resources 
were more important during the conflict with Iran. Even if it’s known that the Gulf war was a 
central factor for the previous Arabization policies in the Al-Anfal campaign, which has got a 
genocidal character, it would still be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of the Gulf War. 
The phase of the campaign that regarded Badinan was initiated after the Gulf War, and this 
may indicate that the campaign was about how Kurds sympathized with Iran, under the Iraq-
Iran war, which is referred to as the “fifth column” (Kaveh, 2014, p. 201). 
 
Kelly (2005) predicted that in court, Saddam Hussein would argue that the Halabja attack was 
aimed at Iranians and Kurds, since the area was occupied by Kurds who supported Iranian 
troops. Kelly also predicted that Hussein would say that for the Iraqi regime, the gassing was 
an attack on “enemies” who tried to occupy their land, and thus the gassing was a legit act 
focusing on securing land and power. Further, Kelly believed that Saddam Hussein would 
express that he had no intention of killing civilians, and that it was rather a counterinsurgency, 
and a way to take back their important area (Kelly, 2005, p. 1008). 
 
It's important to take into account that Saddam Hussein was the only person with prevailing 
authority in Iraq. Furthermore, He saw the opportunity to get rid of both oppositions KDPs 
and PUKs, which will let him gain control over all the strategic, as well as oil rich areas 
(Kaveh, 2014, p. 201). David Callahan mentions three different kinds of factors, that warns us 
about an upcoming ethnic warfare, where he describes that; “a history of state repression of an 
ethnic minority […], a history of violence among ethnic groups, and the existence of ethnic 
pockets within newly independent states” (Callahan, 1997, pp. 53-54, mentioned in Kaveh, 
2014, p. 201).  
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The first factor regards former oppression from the state, regarding the ethnic minority, which 
existed under the Al-Anfal. This is where Callahan mentions that the conflict between the 
Iraqi regime and the Kurds is characterized by an asymmetric power relationship, while the 
oppression was used on Kurds regardless of which actor who had the power. When looking at 
the other factor that was mentioned by Callahan, it refers to the conflict history between 
ethnic groups that existed in Iraq but wasn’t in the same way as in Rwanda or ex-Jugoslavia 
(Kaveh, 2014, p. 201). When looking at the campaign, it’s clear that it was all about the state 
against the Kurds as a specific ethnic group, rather than a conflict between different ethnic 
groups. Another reason could be that when an ethnic group becomes a minority inside a 
newly constructed state, it could create differences and instability. This is what Callahan 
points out as the third factor (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 201-202). 
 
Problems were experienced by the Iraqi regime, when they tried to include Kurds since the 
start. In addition to the weak construction of the Iraqi state which didn’t make the situation 
any better (Kaveh, 2014, pp. 201-202). From this perspective, we can see that Callahan 
factors partially reflects themselves to the argument of the sociologist Helen Fein, who 
mentioned that oppression against minorities and ethnic discrimination might be a warning or 
a sign of an upcoming genocide. Helen Fein comes up with another concept. The concept 
could be relevant in our case, which is called the “implicated victims” (Kaveh, 2014, p. 202; 
Power, 2002, p. 191). Fein argues that most of the victims from genocide, consist of citizens 
who aren’t involved in any political circumstances. In other situations, the leaders of a 
national movement takes a decision which is then used by assailants as an excuse for reacting 
violently towards the group. The scholar Samantha Power takes this argument further, by 
explaining that the situation consists of the Kurds being double complex: 
 
Unlike the Jews of 1930s Europe, who posed no military or even political threat to the 
territorial integrity of Poland and Germany (given their isolation or assimilation in 
much of Europe), the Kurds wanted out – out of Hussein’s smothering grasp and, in 




It wasn’t a secret that Kurds want to be independent and autonomous, while it was president 
Saddam Hussein who took the conversation up regarding their autonomy. This led to an 
agreement. The agreement didn’t come without a reason, and when analysing the situation at 
that time, we will notice that the Baath regime at that time have made a coup for power and 
wasn’t ready for another war. That’s why it was necessary for the Baath regime to prevent any 
conflict with the Kurdish population which could lead to the loss of the regime (Kaveh, 2014, 
p. 202). 
 
3.6 American support  
The support that the Iraqi regime received from Europe and USA was a crucial factor, which 
made it possible for Saddam Hussein to exercise his policy. At this situation, the USA knew 
about the first usage of the chemical weapons in 1983 against the Iranian forces (Kaveh, 2014, 
p. 202). This becomes clear when the American foreign ministry expressed that they knew 
about how “Iraq has aquired a CW [Chemical Weapons] production capacity, primarily from 
Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary” (Kelly, 2008, p. 128, mentioned 
in Kaveh, 2014, p. 202).  
 
This makes us question the missing reaction from USA against the Iraqi regimes’ usage of 
chemical weapons. For the USA, the main focus was to not accept Iranian as the winning part, 
in which the Baath regime knew that attacking with chemical weapons wouldn’t lead to any 
reactions from the Americans side because of their fear of an Iranian victory, as well as that 
the international community would stand by the Americans. This situation gave the Iraqi 
regime the opportunity to use chemical weapons without fearing to get punished by the 
international community. The contradictions, as well as the inconsistency of the American 
foreign policy was even clearer after the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi regime in 1990, 
while the humanitarian situation and the refugee flow forced for the establishment of a fly ban 
on specific areas to protect Kurds. Beyond this, the USA continued selling weapons to Iraq’s 
neighbouring country Turkey, to give them the opportunity to fight their Kurdish civilians. 
There is thus a context between this and Al-Majid’s outbreak (Kaveh, 2014, p. 202), where he 
said that: “I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The 




For USA and Europe, the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime was acceptable, in 
which they accepted to pay the price, if that meant the victory of Iraq against Iran. USA was 
always known to be a neutral part, and to stand against genocide, such as the holocaust, and 
the Armenian genocide, while they ended up supporting Saddam Hussein under Al-Anfal. 
USA didn’t just ally with the Iraqi regime and did support them with credit valued at around 
210 million dollars. These credits could be used by the Iraqis to get corn from the Iowa state 
in America. When Iran attempted to mention and question the chemical weapon attack done 
by the Iraqis at the United Nations security council, their attempts were unsuccessful, since 
they got blocked by the USA (Kaveh, 2014, p. 203; Power, 2002). 
 
Through USAs power, the attention that was drawn by the Iraqi regime since the attack on 
Halabja, had suddenly disappeared, while USA continued to support Saddam Hussein. USA 
didn’t bother the conflict between the regime and the Kurds and thought of the conflict as an 
internal matter of Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq and their neighbour Turkey attempted to put 
pressure on USA, to prevent them from supporting Kurds in any form. Other great powers, 
such as France and the Soviet Union also feared the victory of Iran (Kaveh, 2014, p. 203; 
McDowall, 2000, p. 350; Power, 2002).  
 
3.7 Turning the blind eye to Iraq’s use of gas  
After all, the neutrality of the USA, doesn’t come without reasons, since their worries are 
against the revolutionary Iran (Power, 2002, p. 176). Hiltermanns (2007) argumentation 
surrounds USA neutrality, claiming they remained neutral towards the Iraq-Iran war. USA 
wasn’t positive toward Iraq and its actions but considered “neutrality” and supported Iraq as a 
measure to destroy their common enemy: Iran. In one way, the USAs actions were seen as 
unneutral when favouring Iraq, while on the other side it’s argued that they didn’t support Iraq 
in the fight directly, thus giving the world the impression of being a neutral part (Hiltermann, 
2007, pp. 40-46). 
  
USA feared that Saddam Hussein would lose the war against the revolutionary Iran, where the 
Iraqi oil would fall under the control of Ayatollah Khomeini. Their fear also included the 
destabilization that would come with radical Islam from Iran, which could destroy the 
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cooperation between them, the Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia. These were some of the 
reasons behind the USA supporting Iraq and didn’t stand against Saddam Hussein under Al-
Anfal campaign, because of their need for him to fight against the revolutionary Iran. The 
USA provided a balance of 210 million dollars to the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, 
that could be used as credit for agriculture, where the Iraqi government are allowed to buy 
food, such as rice, grain and wheat from the USA. This amount increased to around 500 
million dollars every year, because of high rating default, as well as poor credit rating made 
the banks reject giving loans to Iraq. They got many other kinds of goods from the USA, such 
as access to import and export credit to have the opportunity of buying goods from the USA. 
What is important to mention is that Iraq was removed by the USA, from the list that 
contained names of all countries that sponsored terrorism. This happened when Baghdad 
banished the terrorist group called Abu Nidal Black June. This cooperation restored and 
strengthened the diplomatic relations at the end of 1984, between the Iraqi government and 
the USA, after the occurrence of an Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967. It was mentioned that USA 
officials got a hold of many details regarding Saddam Hussein’s extensive use of execution 
and torture, but the USA didn’t want to see Iran win the war, and defeat Iraq (Power, 2002, p. 
176-177).  
 
Gradually, the USA realized that both Iraq and Iran were storing weapons and forming 
ideological dissatisfaction that could potentially hurt the USA back, but they didn’t take a step 
further, letting both sides destroy each other in a war. Their rating was that an Iraqi victory 
wouldn’t make much of a difference and won’t be good for the USA interest. Power (2002, p. 
177) describes the reasons behind the USA not fully supporting Iraq, was that if Iran 
collapsed, it would give Saddam Hussein the opportunity to dominate over the Gulf. That’s 
why the USA changed their strategies by leaving the conflict between Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Saddam Hussein (Power, 2002, p. 177). Because Iraq had built strong diplomatic relations 
with the USA, the Kurds started to lose favour in the eyes of the Iraq regime, in which 
Baghdad continued clearing Kurdish territories in 1982. The Iraqi government expanded 
afterwards the inward from the borders, and they intensified their resettlements policies. All 
these actions were done due to lack of control over the Kurds, and that’s the main reason 
behind targeting every Kurd who lived outside major towns or those who didn’t stay next to 
main roads. It was therefore mentioned that when the Kurds were deported by the Iraqi 
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government, they received no compensation before leaving, services were cut, while Kurds 
who stayed were banned from trading (Power, 2002, p. 177).  
 
Power mentions that the Kurds always had been opportunists. The Kurdish political parties 
took the opportunity to cooperate with Iran, when the conflict between Iran and Iraq 
escalated. What made it worse for the Kurds was when one of their factions which was loyal 
to Barzani and supported Iranian soldiers to capture the Iraqi town located next to the borders 
called Haj Omran. This is when the Iraqi army responded by killing over 8000 Kurds from the 
clan of Barzani. Among those who were killed by the Iraqi army were around 315 children 
(Power, 2002, p. 177). Saddam Hussein wasn’t shy and admitted that his forces attacked 
Kurds and said the following “They betrayed the country and they betrayed the covenant, and 
we meted out a stern punishment to them and they went to hell” (Power, 2002, p. 178). Even 
if the Kurds tried to lead up their case to the USA and its allies, neither of them protested on 
the attacks. It was explained by Power (2002) that: 
 
The American tendency to write off the region was so pronounced that the United 
States did not even complain when Hussein acquired between 2,000 and 4,000 tons of 
deadly chemical agents and began experimenting with the gasses against the Iranians. 
Policymakers responded as if the ayatollah had removed the Iranian people (and 
especially Iranian soldiers) from the universe of moral and legal obligation (Power, 
2002, p. 178). 
 
This was until the chemical weapons were used against Iran, in which around 50,000 Iranians 
were either wounded or killed. This led to psychological terror, and many well-equipped 
soldiers fled. The American State Department and the Congress let the chemical weapon 
attack slide, and it took time before the reports regarding the use of chemical weapon came to 
Secretary of State Shultz in 1983, when the spokesman in 1984 issued the so-called 
condemnation. The spokesman described the conflict of being two sided and said “While 
condemning Iraq’s resort to chemical weapons, […] the United States also calls on the 
government of Iran to accept the good offices offered by a number of countries and 
international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed” (Power, 2002, p. 178). Even one of 
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the American intelligence analysts mentioned in March 7th of 1984, that they worry about 
demolishing their connections to Iraq, if they take a position against the Iraqi use of chemical 
weapons. That’s why the effort to promote and create an international treaty for banning use, 
transfer and production of chemical weapons were met with opposition by the Washington 
national security, as well as West Germany, who were profiting by selling chemical agents. 
USA reasoned their mild response on the Iraqi use of chemical weapons by saying that they 
only saw “it as a weapon of last resort deployed only after more traditional Iraqi defences 
were flattened” (Power, 2002, p. 179). Even if the Iraqi government were the first to use 
chemical weapons, it’s said that their operations were seen as defensive, to disrupt and deflect 
Iranian offensives, and that their goal wasn’t to gain ground. What the USA did as a response 
to the reports that regarded chemical weapon, was to claim further investigation with the case. 
Power explains that:  
 
On several occasions the UN dispatched fact-finding teams, which verified that the 
Iraqis had used mustard and tabun gas. But policymakers greeted their reports with an 
insistence that both sides were guilty. Once Hussein saw he would not be sanctioned 
for using these weapons against Iran, the Iraqi dictator knew he was on to something 
(Power, 2002, p. 179). 
 
3.8 Politicide? 
What becomes clear is that the war between Iraq and Iran played an important role during Al-
Anfal, in which it’s stated by Middle East Watch that “The logic of the Anfal […] cannot be 
divorced […] from the Iran-Iraq war” (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. xiii). According to 
Montgomery (2001), he also has a similar view as Middle East Watch and refers to them 
when stating that the Al-Anfal campaign was directly linked to the war between Iraq and Iran 
(Montgomery, 2001, p. 76). It was mentioned by Middle East Watch (1993) that the Kurds 
did cooperate with Iran. PUK and KDP were supported by Iran in challenging the Iraqi 
regimes power. This cooperation is an example of an insurgency, and Middle East Watch 
claims that even though the Iraqi regime had the right to fight the insurgents, “the central 
government went much further than was required to restore its authority through legitimate 
military action” (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. xiii-xiv), and thus, resulting in committing a 
genocide and crimes against humanity (Middle East Watch, 1993, p. xiv). 
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When Barbara Harff (2003) mentions the content of politicide and genocide, she says the 
following: 
 
the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing 
elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities 
– that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized 
ethnic group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators 
primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups 
are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant 
groups. (Harff, 2003, p. 58). 
 
Based on Harffs (2003) definitions, Kaveh (2014) argues that for Saddam Hussein and his 
regime, the Kurds were seen as a politicized ethnic group, in which an example could be how 
Al-Anfal targets were described in the regulations of al-Majid, and in the bureaucracy in 
general. What’s important with Harffs definition of politicide is that terms define conflicts 
and repression where the state itself sees the victims as a political group (Harff, 2003; Kaveh, 
2014, p. 204). Kaveh (2014) argues that the military operations could be put under the 
category of politicide, since the regime aimed at those who were active in acting as an 
opposition, in which the regime chose to annihilate the population, as well as destroying their 
villages, and created fear as a prevention of future opposition (Kaveh, 2014, p. 204). 
 
Al-Anfal is a complicated case, especially when it comes to the genocide convention, because 
Kurds ethnicity was extremely politicized, which we could see through their political 
opposition against Saddam Hussein. Since Kurds weren’t defined by the regime as a specific 
ethnicity, but rather by referring to them according to political or a geographical standpoint, it 
will be difficult to categorize Al-Anfal operations as a genocide, when related to the articles 
in the Genocide Convention. There are disagreements regarding the Kurdish conflict (Kaveh, 





In order to fight the rebels, most of rural Kurdistan was declared “prohibited”, and the 
villages in these areas were marked for destruction regardless of the question whether 
the inhabitants actively participated in the insurgency or in any other way offered 
support to the rebels. (Hiltermann, 1994, p. 41).  
 
Even if we think that Hiltermans arguments are correct, it’s clearly mentioned by Kaveh 
(2014) that his conclusions are based on Hiltermans interpretation and understanding of the 
Genocide Convention. Because of it, when comparing the interpretation to the campaign, we 
can see that even if Al-Anfal was aimed at destroying a group in partial or as a whole, the 
definition of the convention makes it difficult to apply genocide as a term in this context 
(Kaveh, 2014, p. 204). Assailants aren’t the only ones who had the opportunity to get away 
from the law through cases such as politicide, and that’s because it doesn’t get mentioned 
within the genocide convention. This also includes third parties, where they refer to states’ 
sovereignty of internal affairs to avoid responsibility. In this context the USA gave its support 
directly to Saddam Hussein and his regime, without fearing the consequences since they could 
throw the responsibility to the regime, and by using sovereignty as an argument (Kaveh, 2014, 
p. 204). 
 
It’s therefore argued by Kaveh (2014) that it would be an understandable reaction by a state to 
react in a violent way, when a group stands against the regimes expectations and demands 
regarding territoriality, just like the Kurds who lived in Iraq. It’s therefore argued that 
massacre and genocide within their borders is a right in which a territorial state is entitled to 
“…as an integral part of its sovereignty …”. (Kuper, 1981, p. 161, mentioned in Kaveh, 2014, 
p. 204). A states’ indivisibility is a right, where even the United Nations have confirmed this 
by prohibiting “any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity of any other state or country” (Callahan, 1997, p. 25, mentioned in Kaveh, 
2014, p. 204).  
 
That’s why it doesn’t always make sense to explain mass killings, just by looking at the 
genocide convention, and especially when trying to understand the reasons behind the state 
deciding to exercise mass killing (Kaveh, 2014, p. 204-205). Just like the scholar Martin van 
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Bruinessen who mentioned: “As long as nonintervention in any country’s “internal affairs” 
remains a sacrosanct principle without further qualification, attempts to revise the definition 
of the term genocide are, I am afraid, bound to remain a futile intellectual exercise” 
(Bruinessen, 1994, p. 142). 
 
The conduct of Saddam Hussein was intentional and resulted in mass killings on Kurds in the 
1980s, but since the genocide convention has its weaknesses, and especially when trying to 
apply genocide as a legal term, it would be hard to categorize the conflict. This is where the 
Iraqi regime gets its advantage by considering the mass killings to be a politicide, in which 
they will have the opportunity to cover their wrong doings by defining it as a political conflict 
between the regime and Kurds. Therefore, from the regimes perspective it could be argued 
that because of their violent behaviour as a result of political factors, the Iraqi regime had to 
defend itself against the rebellions, and therefore has the legitimate right to use measures in 
order to maintain peace by going on a counterinsurgency (Kaveh, 2014, p. 205). 
      
3.9 Importance of recognition 
Since we have seen that the involvement that US had to support Iraq to defeat Iran had a big 
impact on how they viewed the conflict between the Iraqi regime and the Kurds in the 
northern region, just by saying that it’s an internal conflict between the regime and its 
citizens, in which it has sovereignty and that no other state should involve itself. By looking at 
the conflict from the USAs perspective, it will be clear that since their strategy was to defeat 
the expansion of the Iranian revolution, by supporting Iraq, their view on the Kurds would be 
similar, when the Kurds cooperated and supported Iran (Kaveh, 2014; Power, 2002).  
 
This is one point of describing it to be a political conflict, which provoked Saddam Hussein 
and his regime to attack the Kurdish villages to prevent their cooperation with Iran. The next 
question would be related to why it would be important to EU to consider the conflict to be a 
genocide. Since EU wasn’t involved in the same way as USA, it would be important from 
their point of view to consider it to be a genocide for the sake of the victims who died under 
the Al-Anfal campaign. It would be crucial in that way to achieve justice for those who have 
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been injured, died, and to those who have fled and lost their homes (Kaveh, 2014; Power, 
2002).  
 
The UK, Norway and Sweden are countries who have recognized the conflict and defines it as 
a genocide (Baser & Toivanen, 2017, p. 405). Through recognition, UNPO & the Kurdish 
Regional Government see the possibility of promotion when it comes to reconciliation, rule of 
law and peace within the country. By doing so, the committed atrocities by the Iraqi regime 
would give the opportunity to point out the failures of the international community, where 
they failed to protect the Kurdish population and their rights, in which under and after the 
atrocities were done, no pressure was made by the international community in order to 
prevent the regime from continuing their violations (Kurdish UK Representation, London, 
mentioned in UNPO & the Kurdish Regional Government, n.d., p. 7). Another important 
event was the statement that came from the Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation, 
where Struan Stevenson stated that the recognition of the campaign as a genocide against the 
Kurdish population would be important, because of “In current Iraq, under the rule of Prime 
Minister Maliki, the danger of a genocide happening again is present and therefore it is even 
more important now to keep the remembrance of Halabja alive” (Kurdish UK Representation, 
London, mentioned in UNPO & the Kurdish Regional Government, n.d., p. 7). 
 
Through his statement, we can highlight that the recognition isn’t only about to compensate 
and support the Kurds who were affected by the campaign, and that it would be important to 
prevent similar crimes in the future, and especially after the fall of the Iraqi regime of Saddam 
Hussein after the USAs invasion, which created an interethnic tension in the country. UNPO 
& the Kurdish Regional Government appeals to EU and argues that the recognition could 
create stability and make democratization possible, in which the recognition would be seen as 
a measure of futuristic prevention of a new genocide in the region. Through it, the EU would 
have the opportunity to play an important role, by promoting stability and unification between 
citizens in Iraq, to hinder atrocities in the future, and also to benefit the countries 
democratization process. The democratization process would create a peaceful and a 
democratic society in Iraq, by showing the society through EUs recognition that the rule of 
law and the human rights are to be trusted (UNPO & the Kurdish Regional Government, n.d., 
p. 7).  
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Beyond this, the Kurds suffered a lot of trauma, especially those who have been genocide 
victims or who have lost their families, and therefore the relationship between Kurds and the 
Arabs consist of distrust between both ethnicities. The recognition by EU could contribute to 
help and heal Kurds wounds from the events, by trying to promote for the opportunity of 
social reconstruction, as well as reconciliation in the country, between the Iraqi Arabs and the 
Kurds (UNPO & the Kurdish Regional Government, n.d., p. 7). 
 
3.10 Reasons behind legally recognizing Al-Anfal as a genocide 
First of all, it’s important to mention that the Iraqi High Court recognized Halabja to be a 
genocide, and this happened after formation of the new government after the fall of the Baath 
regime (Trahan, 2009; UNPO & the Kurdish Regional Government, p. 5). Their recognition 
of it involved punishing al-Majid to death, and that for his decision to attack by using 
chemical weapons on Halabja. Within international law, it’s found that genocide describes 
violent crimes which are committed with an intent to destroy, whether it’s in part or as a 
whole, the Kurdish existence (Baser & Toivanen, 2017, p. 409; UNPO & the Kurdish 
Regional Government, p. 5), by five different kinds of punishable acts, such as: 
 
1. Killing members of the group; 
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group; 
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its Physical destruction in whole 
or in part; 
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group; 
5. Forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group (BBC, 2007, mentioned in UNPO & the Kurdish 




When comparing these to the events under Al-Anfal, it would be noticed that Al-Anfal 
operations were targeting specifically Kurds from Iraq, which is a specific group of people, 
and because of their ethnical difference, they became the targets of the Baath regime, and 
went through the so-called Arabization campaign, where many villages were destroyed, and 
many were executed. In addition to this, when looking at the Kurds perspective of the 
situation, we will notice that their cooperation with Iran is understood differently. For Kurds, 
the northern region is theirs, and they therefore look at it as their own region called Kurdistan, 
which consist of Kurds. They argue that the Iraqi conflict with Kurds is about taking control 
over the Kurdish region, which isn’t logical since Kurdish rebels controlled the area (UNPO 
& the Kurdish Regional Government, n.d., p. 5).  
 
Some evidence regarding the regimes intention to commit actions that is seen as genocide 
could be explained through a Human Rights Watch report (UNPO & the Kurdish Regional 
Government, n.d., p. 6), that refers to at least three purposes for the Baath regime to use 
chemical weapons such as: 
 
• To attack base camps and concentrations of Kurdish people, including Kurdish 
rebels; 
• To inflict exemplary collective punishment on civilians for their support for 
Kurdish rebels. […] 
• To spread terror amongst the civilian population as a whole, flushing villagers 
out of their homes to facilitate their capture, relocation and killing (UNPO & 
the Kurdish Regional Government, n.d., p. 6). 
 






4 Discussions  
This chapter will highlight interesting discussions from the analysis. The information which 
has been mentioned earlier will in this chapter, be connected to clarify USAs standpoint and 
the unrecognition of Al-Anfal. This will be drafted upon other perspectives from the 
literature.   
 
4.1 USA – an Iraqi ally during Al-Anfal?   
All of the data collected by different scholars through the thesis shows us that the Iraqi regime 
had violated the human rights of Kurds, in which many were treated badly, executed, removed 
from their homes, and prisoned. These are serious violations, which have injured many Kurds 
in this period. But this doesn’t mean that the attacks were directly targeting the whole 
population of Kurds within the northern region of Iraq. We can see that the conflict started 
and escalated when the Kurds allied with Iran under the conflict between Iraq-Iran, where the 
Iraqi regime saw upon them as traitors (Kaveh, 2014; Middle East Watch, 1993).  
 
Through analyzation, it becomes clear that states have different meanings about the Al-Anfal 
campaign. When comparing US and western states, who has many common values such as 
democracy and human rights, we will still see that they have different views on the campaign 
that occurred in Iraq under the Baath regime (Baser & Toivanen, 2017; UNPO & the Kurdish 
Regional Government, n.d.). On one side, Kaveh (2014) and Power (2002) argues that the US 
was involved in the conflict between Iraq and Iran to fight the Iranian revolution, in which 
they had to support Iraq, by standing on their side politically and industrially. Since their goal 
was to defeat Iran, their focus was therefore political.  
 
USA saw Iraq as an independent regime with its own sovereignty, who can decide what to do 
without the involvement of foreign countries. When Kurds who lived within the northern 
region cooperated and helped Iran in crossing the borders to Iraq, it provoked not only 
Saddam Hussein, but the whole government who saw their actions as betrayal. In the eyes of 
every Arab in Iraq, the northern region was a part of Iraq and was therefore ruled by an Iraqi 
government. To see the Kurds cooperating with Iran made them also the enemy of the Iraqi 
regime. From the Arabs perspective it’s seen as a betrayal, while on the other side, many 
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Kurds saw the northern region as an area for Kurds, and they used to call it Kurdistan Iraq, 
where a part of Kurds and especially those who were politically involved from PUK and KDP 
saw Kurdistan as an independent region, in which a cooperation with Iran wouldn’t make 
them betrayals (Kaveh, 2014).  
 
As a summary, we can say that based on the literature study, we have found two approaches 
to the research question. Firstly, the US may have rejected to recognize the campaign as an 
incident of genocide because it was a political conflict. Based on Harff (2003), it is reasonable 
to assume that the campaign must be considered as a politicide. To the Baath regime, the 
Kurds who didn’t want to move from the northern region of Iraq were seen as insurgents and 
allies of Iran. To stop the alliance Iraq had to act and banned Kurds from living in north of 
Iraq. The argument of the campaign being a politicide, is supported by the fact that Iraq’s 
intention was to handle “a political conflict” rather than killing an ethnical group (Kaveh, 
2014). 
 
From this perspective we can understand that the conflict was political, in which Kurds aimed 
at cooperating with Iran, to get their independence from Iraq. This situation indicates that the 
conflict started as a political conflict. Afterwards, when the Iraqi army targeted a specific area 
in northern Iraq, it was described to be targeting a tribe which cooperated and started the 
alliance with Iran. Since the regime was dependent of the northern area for resources, such as 
oil, as well as the highway which gives them the opportunity to export and import resources 
through the borders with Turkey and Europe, they feared that the alliance between Kurds and 
Iran would impair the Iraqi regime. That was the main reason for the regime to force Kurds 
out of the northern region, in which their aim was to gain control over the northern region, to 
prevent the cooperation and to secure their borders (Kaveh, 2014; Saeedpour, 1992).  
 
Through the explanations, we see that it was difficult to fight Peshmerga, and the Kurds who 
were allied with Iran, because they lived among the Kurdish population. That’s why the 
regime created fear among the Kurdish population, to force them to move to the cities, or in 
camps along the highway, to gain control and fight those who were against the regime. 
Although, the plan of the regime wasn’t successful, and not everybody was willing to move 
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and leave their homes. Here, we see the ignorance from the regime, where they ignored 
civilians who weren’t involved, in which the regime didn’t find any measures for them. 
Therefore, to target the areas, and to use chemical weapons against all civilians shows only 
irresponsibility. In this situation, it becomes clear that the regime had violated the human 
rights of many Kurds, those who moved and were interrogated, executed and poisoned, as 
well as those who stayed and got killed by the chemical weapons (Kaveh, 2014; Middle East 
Watch, 1993).  
 
4.2 A conscious choice 
Secondly, the US rejection was a result of a conscious choice. One may argue that the US 
intentionally chose to not label it as a “genocide”, in order to keep their cooperation with Iraq. 
Recognizing it as a genocide, would lead to sanctions against Iraq, in which it could destroy 
their relationship with Iraq. Sanctioning Iraq could result in weakening the Iraqi regime 
resulting in Iran’s victory. This was understood to be the opposite of what US wanted, thus 
supporting Iraq would be their best option. The US had the opportunity to reject the 
recognition of Al-Anfal, since there wasn’t an international agreement upon labelling it as a 
genocide (Hiltermanns, 2007; Power, 2002).      
 
When the Iraqi regime was provoked, they took actions and used strategies to Arabize the 
northern region, and to force Kurds to live in cities, or in gathering places to prevent them 
from having the opportunity to cooperate with their biggest enemy Iran. The regime focused 
on attacking villages that consisted of Kurdish tribes, who were known to be cooperating with 
Iran, and targeted villages that were involved. If the regime had targeted every Kurd in the 
country, it could easily be a genocide, but in this case, we can see that only those who were 
seen as betrayals were targeted, while others had to move further south in the country. What is 
interesting to know is that many of those working in the Iraqi army, and in the government 
were ethnically Kurds, who worked and conducted their work against those who were seen as 
betrayals. From this perspective we can see that the campaign wasn’t focusing on eradicating 
a whole or a part of an ethnic group, and only focused their attack on those who were guilty 




The regime warned every citizen to not live in specific areas within the northern region, but 
their use of chemical weapons shows irresponsibility and ignorance by the regime. Many 
innocent people were killed because of their use of chemical weapon, which shows us that 
their actions are a crime against the citizens, but that doesn’t give the right to consider it to be 
a genocide, since the genocide convention has rules (Hiltermann, 1994; Kaveh, 2014).  
 
What makes it hard to recognize the conflict as a genocide, was that not all Kurds were 
targeted, since there were many Kurds who worked within the government, inside the army, 
while there were others who were willing to move and lived in other cities. Since the US 
feared the Iranian revolution, they had to stand by the Iraqi regime and support them to fight 
against Iran. They had to find an ally, who had the same interest in fighting the Iranian 
regime. This gave US the opportunity to strengthen their diplomatic relations and to support 
the Iraqi regime with credit that could be used to buy resources and food from them. Because 
of the cooperation between the US and Iraq who had common goals, we can see that Kurds 
were an obstacle to their goals. The standpoint of the US was since the start political, in which 
they saw the Al-Anfal campaign to be politically aimed. That was one of the main reasons for 
the US to reject the campaign being a genocide (Kaveh, 2014; Power, 2002).  
 
Kaveh (2014) argues that it’s difficult to put Al-Anfal campaign under the term “genocide”, 
since the Iraqi regime considered the Kurds in north as insurgents. The campaign targeted 
Kurds who stayed and continued living within the northern region, in which it didn’t target all 
Kurds throughout Iraq. This argument strengthens the US standpoint of the campaign being a 
politicide. On the other hand, Kurds disagree and argues that the conflict must be considered 
as a genocide, since Saddam Hussein targeted a specific group, who were in their eyes a part 
of the Kurdish group, which fulfils one of the requirements within the genocide convention. 
Their other argument was that using chemical weapons to kill and to create fear shows only a 
crime against humanity, and mentions that those who are innocent, and who were injured 
won’t calm down until the guilty would be punished for their actions (Middle East Watch, 




4.3 Genocide – a weak definition?  
Since western states weren’t directly involved between Iraq and Iran under Saddam Husseins 
regime, they didn’t have the same standpoint of the situation as the US, they therefore saw the 
conflict from a different perspective, and focused mostly on citizens satisfaction, justice and 
democratization, in which many European countries agreed upon recognising the campaign 
being a genocide, not only to satisfy Kurds, but also to protect human rights and to strengthen 
the reputation of the international community. On one side we can see that there were 
different opinions regarding the actions of the Baath regime, and whether their actions were 
against Kurds as an ethnic group. There are many reasons which suggest that the campaign 
wasn’t a genocide, but rather a politicide, which makes states such as US reject considering it 
to be a genocide, in which one of their biggest influences were their involvement to defeat 
Iran, by supporting Iraq, and to back them up in political meetings to prevent the international 
community from intervening, and to give Iraq the opportunity to fight without any obstacles 
(Baser & Toivanen, 2017; UNPO & the Kurdish Regional Government, n.d.).   
 
On the other hand, when we look at other western states such as for example Norway’s 
perspective, we see that they base their facts upon reports from non-governmental 
organizations, who describes how the Iraqi regime violated the human rights and used 
chemical weapons to kill many Kurdish civilians, who weren’t involved in the conflict. Since 
there aren’t specific meanings for the term genocide, we will see that states interpret it 
differently, in which it creates confusion among states. Even if the Genocide Convention 
mentions different violations, it’s hard to categorize every conflict, and especially when the 
conflict is based on politics, and not on ethnic cleansing. Since the actions of the Iraqi regime 
were immense and led to the death of many Kurds, due to the irresponsibility of the regime, 
we can say that the Norwegian state considers this event to be a genocide against the Kurdish 
population (Baser & Toivanen, 2017; Kaveh, 2014; Middle East Watch, 1993).  
   
It's interesting to see that the Genocide Convention has a weak definition, because states can 
openly define and understand it differently. This was also mentioned by Kaveh (2014) who 
mentioned its weakness by describing how states categorize conflicts through their own 
perspective, which bases it on opinions. There are contradictory opinions regarding Al-Anfal, 
where it becomes difficult to either accept it as a genocide or a politicide. This makes us 
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question if the convention could have a clearer definition, which could create a common 
understanding among states internationally, regarding how, and when conflicts could be 

























This thesis is an attempt to collect relevant sources to find an answer behind the reasons 
regarding why the USA didn’t recognize Al-Anfal to be a genocide. Many countries have a 
different view on whether it could be recognized because of the Kurds situation under the 
Baath regime. Through the collected data, it becomes clear that one of the biggest reasons for 
USA to not consider it to be a genocide, was because they were involved in the conflict, in 
which they focused on fighting the Iranian revolution, and therefore had to support Saddam 
Hussein and his Baath regime. Their only victory was to support the Baath regime in order to 
win the fight against Iran. USA feared Iran, more than Iraq, and didn’t have any other choice 
rather than supporting Saddam Hussein. Their economic support in the form of credit for 
industry support showed the strong relationship that was built between Saddam Hussein and 
USA. This situation was misused by the Baath regime, in which they noticed that the USA 
needed their support to win over Iran, and they therefore misused the situation for their best. 
The Baath regime misused the relationship to be protected by USA in front of the 
international community, while they could revenge themselves on Kurds who supported and 
cooperated with Iran, when the Iranian army came across the borders to Iraq through Kurdish 
support. The revenge that could be seen through research, showed that the only group of 
Kurds who were attacked by the Iraqi army, were those who had an involvement, or whom 
supported Iran. This shows that the attack by the Iraqi regime wasn’t targeting the whole 
ethnicity, in which it becomes a genocide, but was rather a political conflict seen from the 
Americans perspective. This strengthens their view and makes them see the conflict to be a 
politicide, rather than a genocide. What’s interesting is that the Genocide Convention isn’t 
clearly defined, in which it creates different perspectives and understandings, when it comes 
to the understanding of the term by different states. My recommendation for future research 
could be about continuing to research the terms genocide and politicide, and how different 
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